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Destructive Federal Preemption of
State Wealth Transfer Law in
Beneficiary Designation Cases:
Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff
John H. Langbein*
The probate codes in about a third of the states contain a so-called
divorce revocation provision, applicable both to probate and nonprobate
transfers.Such statutesaddress the situation in which a transferor'swill or will
substitute designates as a beneficiary a person who was the transferor'sspouse
at the time that the transferorexecuted the document, but whom the transferor
later divorced. The premise of these statutes is that divorce entails a profound
change of circumstances not foreseen by the transferor,and that the transferor
is unlikely to have intended to benefit an ex-spouse. Accordingly, the intentimplementing purpose of wealth transfer law is better served by having a
default rule that treats the subsequent divorce as having revoked any provision
for the now-ex-spouse unless the document expressly provides otherwise.
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001), the Supreme Court held that when the
instrument of transfer is a beneficiary designation in a pension plan or life
insurancepolicy subject to federal regulation under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA'), the otherwise applicable state divorce
revocation statute is preempted, even though ERISA makes no mention of
divorce revocation. The Court reasoned that enforcing the state divorce
revocation statute would "interfere with nationally uniform plan
administration."
Because the result in Egelhoff allowed supposed plan-level
administrative convenience to defeat the principled objective of the divorce
revocation statutes, a number of courts reacted by allowing so-called post-

*
Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University. This article refers to
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (19992011) and the Uniform Probate Code (1989-90 rev.) ("UPC"). I served as Associate Reporter for
the Restatement and as a member of the drafting committees that revised the UPC, but the views
expressed here are not voiced on behalf of the American Law Institute or the Uniform Law
Commission. I acknowledge with gratitude suggestions from William Eskridge, Albert Feuer, Abbe
Gluck, Robert Sitkoff, Stewart Sterk, Lawrence W. Waggoner, and Edward Zelinsky.
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distribution relief, in some cases pursuant to a state statute so providing.
Obeying Egelhoff, these courtspreempted the state divorce revocation law at the
plan level, thereby permitting the ex-spouse to receive the designated benefit
from the plan, but allowing the person(s) entitled under the divorce revocation
statute to recover those proceeds from the ex-spouse in a subsequent state-court
action based on unjust enrichment. In a 2013 decision, Hillman v. Maretta,
involving an insurance policy purchased under a program for federal
employees, the Supreme Court extended preemption to forbid such postdistributionrelief.
In this Article, I point to serious shortcomings in the reasoning and
policy merits of Egelhoff and Hillman. There is no federal policy favoring
wealth transfer to ex-spouses. The divorce revocationstatutes exemplify the core
policy value of state wealth transfer law, which is to implement the transferor's
intent, a policy distinct from and congruent with the purposes of the federal
statutes on which the Court based preemption in the two cases. Unless Congress
intervenes or unless the Courtpermits the development of a federal common law
of divorce revocation, Egelhoff and Hillman will saddle American wealth
transfer law with needlessly contradictoryfederal and state rules, sometimes
applicable to different transfers by the same transferor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a pair of decisions rendered a dozen years apart concerning
beneficiary designations in financial accounts that pass wealth on
death, Hillman v. Maretta (2013)1 and Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001),2 the
U.S. Supreme Court has managed to get itself on the wrong side of two
great social and demographic trends. One is the spread of divorce.
Couples are no longer locked into failed marriages, and the divorce rate

1.
2.

133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
532 U.S. 141 (2001).
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now exceeds forty percent. 3 The other great trend is the transformation
in the patterns of wealth transmission on death known as the
nonprobate revolution,4 that is, the increasing tendency to transfer
wealth by means of beneficiary designations in accounts administered
by financial intermediaries such as life insurance companies, banks,
investment companies, pension plans, and trust companies. 5 These
nonprobate modes of transfer have become so pervasive that, in the
affairs of many (probably now most) decedents, more wealth passes by
means of financial-account beneficiary designations than by will or
intestacy in the traditional probate process. 6
In the American system of dual federal and state jurisdiction,
state law governs the process of wealth transfer on death, typically
under comprehensive legislation that, although commonly called the
probate code, also covers nonprobate transfers. 7 Because probate and
nonprobate transfers have the same purpose, transferring the
decedent's wealth to his or her intended beneficiaries, the modern codes

3.
"For the average couple marrying for the first time in recent years, the lifetime probability
of divorce or separation now falls between 40 and 50 percent." UNIV. OF VA., THE NAT'L MARRIAGE
PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN 2012, at 67 (2012). Regarding the background,
see, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); W. Bradford Wilcox, The

Evolution of Divorce, 1 NAT'L AFF. 81 (2009).
4.
See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-DeathDeeds: The NonprobateRevolution Continues,
41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529 (2006); John H. Langbein, The NonprobateRevolution and the
Futureof the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
5.
The typical beneficiary designation takes the juridical form of a contract term in an
account with a financial intermediary. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 ("UPC") (identifying and
validating a wide range of mostly contract-based will substitutes). For the carriage trade, the
revocable trust is the characteristic nonprobate device. The Uniform Trust Code "treat[s] the
revocable trust as the functional equivalent of a will." UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 6, gen. cmt. In many
states the owner of an interest in real property may now transfer it by means of a beneficiary
designation; regarding which, see Gary, supra note 4. A recently promulgated uniform act is likely
to facilitate the spread of such transfers. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT (2009)
(codified at UPC art. 6, pt. 4).
6.
For recent data on the asset magnitudes of the main will substitutes, see John H.
Langbein, Major Reforms of the PropertyRestatement and the Uniform ProbateCode: Reformation,
Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 12-14 (2012). There has been a
pronounced trend in the private pension system over the past generation toward individual
account plans-that is, defined contribution plans and individual retirement accounts. Regarding
the causes and consequences, see, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm,
114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004). This trend has greatly increased the number of pension accounts in
which the account holder dies with a transferable balance in the account. Beneficiary designations
govern the proceeds in such accounts. In a defined benefit plan, by contrast, annuitization is the
prevalent mode of distribution. The plan pays a lifetime benefit that ceases on the death of the
survivor of the participant and his or her spouse, and there is no account balance on death.
7.
For example, the Uniform Probate Code, which is primarily concerned with probate
transfers, governs various aspects of nonprobate transfers in Article II, Part 8, and in Article VI.
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strive to unify the field by applying common constructional principles
to both. 8
II. DIVORCE REVOCATION
The intersection of liberalized divorce with the world of
nonprobate transfers occurs in consequence of a recurrent situation.
John and Mary are spouses. While married, John executes a beneficiary
designation form governing a financial account, say a life insurance
policy or a retirement plan, naming Mary as the death beneficiary if she
survives him. Under the contract with the financial intermediary that
creates the account, John, the account owner, may revoke the
beneficiary designation at any time until his death, usually by
substituting a different beneficiary. Some time after John names Mary
as his beneficiary, often years later, the marriage sours, and John and
Mary divorce. John, not thinking about the implications of the divorce
for this transfer-on-death designation, neglects to update it.
Subsequently, John dies, having left in force the pre-divorce designation
that names Mary, now his ex-spouse, to take the account proceeds. 9
Cases of this sort are less likely to occur among affluent persons who,
when they divorce, are commonly represented by specialist legal
counsel, whose job includes prompting clients to review and update
estate planning documents. Thus, these cases of stale spousal
8.
See, e.g, UPC art. II, prefatory note (discussing the objective to "bring the law of probate
and nonprobate transfers into greater unison"). See generally Grayson M.P. McCouch, ProbateLaw
Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 757 (2008).
9.
Regarding the causes of such oversight, bear in mind that 'i]t is not uncommon for a
propertied person to have a dozen or more will-like beneficiary designations in effect on various
banking, investment, insurance, and pension accounts." Langbein, supra note 6, at 12. For
evidence that account holders sometimes lose track of such accounts, see Langbein, supranote 4,
at 1109-10 n.3. Sterk and Leslie point out that beneficiary designations on employer-provided
pension, savings, and insurance accounts are commonly executed in connection with initial
employment paperwork, when wealth transfer on death "is far from the employee's
mind .... [Thereafter, employees] may not look again at those forms for decades; many will have
no idea whom they designated as beneficiaries, and no idea how to find out." Stewart E. Sterk &
Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental Inheritance:Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 167-68 (2014). An expert advisory panel examining ERISA beneficiary
designation problems concluded in a 2012 report to the Department of Labor (the agency charged
with overseeing the operation of ERISA) that this potential for a beneficiary designation form to
'remain on file for a very long time, sometimes decades, without review ... increases the likelihood
that the original designation may not reflect the [transferor's] current intent." ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, CURRENT CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES
CONCERNING BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS IN RETIREMENT AND LIFE INSURANCE PLANS 4 (2012),

available at www.dol.goc/ebsa/pdf/2012ACreportl.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45ZF-WW59.
The report found that "[t]he most common and frequently contentious disputes [arising from
ERISA beneficiary designations] occur where participants marry or divorce but fail to update their
beneficiary designations to reflect this change of status before their death." Id. at 3.
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beneficiary designations arise mostly among persons of modest
means-persons who, when they divorce, do not find their way to expert
counsel, or indeed, to any counsel. 10
Sixteen American states address cases of this sort in their
probate codes by means of what is called a divorce revocation statute,
applicable both to probate and nonprobate transfers." The statutes
provide as a default rule that a subsequent divorce revokes any predivorce provision for the ex-spouse. 12 This divorce revocation rule
originated in the law of wills and was extended to financial-account
beneficiary designations as their use spread. 13 What motivates the rule
is the understanding that divorce commonly entails a sufficiently
traumatic breach in the relations of the former spouses that they are
not likely thereafter to intend to benefit each other by means of wealth
transfer on death.14 Moreover, divorce commonly entails a lifetime
division of the former spouses' property, which supersedes estate
planning objectives previously formulated during the marriage. 1 5
Accordingly, what John really meant when he designated Mary as the
beneficiary is that he intended Mary to take on the condition that they
remained married. A rule imputing that condition will reflect the

10. Offers of do-it-yourself divorce kits abound on the internet. See, e.g., Do It Yourself
Divorce, QUICK-DIVORCE.COM, http://www.quick-divorce.com/index.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/3UHB-7FUY (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).
11. Divorce revocation laws extending to nonprobate transfers, mostly derived from Uniform
Probate Code § 2-804, are in force in Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington. For references to the statutes, see EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED,
WILL CONTESTS § 5:19 (2d ed. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 4.1(b)

statutory notes 2(b)-(c) (1999) ("PROPERTY RESTATEMENT").

12. The statutes treat the ex-spouse as though he or she disclaimed the interest passing
under the beneficiary designation, e.g., UPC § 2-804(d); or as though the ex-spouse predeceased
the decedent, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994), which was the provision at issue in
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001). In either case the ex-spouse's interest lapses, and
the lapsed interest passes to the next contingent taker named in the beneficiary designation or in
the account's default terms. In the rare case in which the account identifies no such alternative
taker, the asset would pass with the decedent's probate estate. See, e.g., UPC § 2-101(a).

13. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-MarriageSociety and Spousal Rights Under
the Revised Uniform ProbateCode, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1991).
14. "Divorce usually represents a stormy parting, where the last thing one of the parties
wishes is to have an earlier will carried out giving everything to the former spouse." Raymond H.
Young, ProbateReform, 18 BOS. B.J. 7, 11 (1974), quoted with approval in Clymer v. Mayo, 473
N.E.2d 1084, 1092 (Mass. 1985).
15. A point emphasized by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Egelhoff, in which he observed
that by defeating the operation of the divorce revocation statute at issue in that case, "the Court
permits a divorced wife, who already acquired, during the divorce proceeding, her fair share of the
couple's community property, to receive in addition the benefits that the divorce court awarded to
her former husband." 532 U.S. at 159.
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intention of the typical decedent much more often than not. 16 In keeping
with the intent-implementing purpose, divorce revocation statutes
invariably take the form of a default rule that the transferor may
defeat,1 7 either by inserting a term in the beneficiary designation
countermanding the rule, or by executing a post-divorce beneficiary
designation in favor of the former spouse.
The intent-implementing purpose of the divorce revocation
statutes is an expression of the dominant policy of American wealth
transfer law, which is to give effect to the intention of the transferor.18
This principle governs the interpretation of beneficiary designations.
The Restatement (Third) of Property says: "The controlling
consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the
donor's intention."1 9 Both the Uniform Probate Code 2 0 and the
Restatement 21 codify the divorce revocation rule. Although the rule is
in force in only a minority of the states, 22 no state has legislation
mandating a contrary result. Thus, the divorce revocation rule is
universally preferred in the statute law of every state in which the
legislature has addressed the question of whether a transferor is likely
to have intended a spousal beneficiary designation to remain in effect
in the event the parties subsequently divorce. 2 3
Astonishingly, however, in Hillman and Egelhoff the Supreme
Court suppressed the state divorce revocation statutes and ordered the
account property to pass to the ex-spouse under the beneficiary
designation that the deceased spouse had executed before the marriage
dissolved. In neither case did the Court deny or even discuss the policy
16. In the law of donative transfers, "[t]he foundational constructional preference is for the
construction that is more in accord with common intention than other plausible constructions."
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 11.3(c).
17. For example, the operative provision of the Uniform Probate Code version commences
with the proviso that divorce revocation pertains "[e]xcept as provided by the express terms of' the
beneficiary designation or other governing instrument. UPC § 2-804(b).
18. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 10.1.
19. Id.
20. UPC § 2-804.
21. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 4.1(b) ("The dissolution of the testator's
marriage is a change in circumstance that presumptively revokes any provision in the testator's
will in favor of his or her former spouse.").
22. For cases refusing to apply the divorce-revocation rule to insurance contracts in the
absence of a statute, see Kristen P. Raymond, Note, Double Trouble An Ex-Spouse's Life
Insurance Beneficiary Status and State Automatic Revocation upon Divorce Statutes: Who Gets
What?, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 399, 407 n.35 (2013).
23. States that have enacted such a rule are listed supra note 11. In Massachusetts, when
the express terms of the state divorce-revocation rule still addressed only wills, the Supreme
Judicial Court extended the rule to nonprobate transfers by trust. See Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d
1084, 1093 (Mass. 1985). Massachusetts has since adopted the Uniform Probate Code provision.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-803 (2014).
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merits of the divorce revocation rule. Rather, the Court held that,
because the beneficiary designations in question were found in financial
accounts authorized or regulated under federal statutes, federal law
preempted the state divorce revocation statutes, even though the
federal statutes were wholly silent about divorce revocation.
III. PREEMPTION: EGELHOFF
The entanglement of federal law and federal courts with
nonprobate wealth transfer, and the consequent potential for
preemption of the state-law rules that commonly govern the field, arise
in circumstances in which federal law creates or regulates financial
accounts that authorize beneficiary designations. Hillman concerned a
beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy issued under a
congressionally established benefit program for federal employees. 24
The accounts in Egelhoff were found in private-sector employee benefit
plans that were federally regulated under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 25 In such cases, from the standpoint of
wealth transfer law, the federal law is fragmentary. Federal law
touches the wealth transfer field to the extent of regulating or
facilitating the creation of financial accounts that contain beneficiary
designations, but the federal law does not concern itself with the
recurrent constructional complications that arise in the wealth transfer
process-matters that are addressed comprehensively in the state
probate codes and state decisional law. There is no doubt that, under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 26 Congress has the power to
forbid the application of state wealth transfer law to a federally
authorized account. The question that arose in Egelhoff and Hillman
was whether Congress had done so by implication from accountcreating or account-regulating federal statutes that do not even
mention the relevant provision of state wealth transfer law, here
divorce revocation.
Egelhoff2 7 concerned beneficiary designations on two employerprovided accounts, a pension plan and a group life insurance policy. 28
24.

See infra text accompanying note 86.

25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012).
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
27. 532 U.S 141 (2001).
28. Group life insurance is a characteristic employee benefit. An employer or an entity such
as a labor union or a professional association contracts with an insurer to make insurance available
to all members of the particular workforce or other group. Group insurance is commonly less costly
than comparable coverage under individually purchased policies, because insuring an entire
workforce spares the transaction costs and adverse selection risks associated with the sale and
underwriting of individual policies. In the United States as of 2011, group insurance constituted
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David Egelhoff owned the accounts through his employment with
Boeing, the aerospace firm. David designated his wife Donna as the
death beneficiary on both accounts. David and Donna, who were
domiciliaries of Washington State, subsequently divorced. Two months
later, David died in an automobile accident without having revoked the
beneficiary designations to Donna. Pursuant to those designations,
Donna collected the life insurance proceeds and also claimed the
pension benefit. David's children by a former marriage, who would have
been entitled to both accounts under Washington's divorce revocation
law, 2 9 sued Donna in state court to recover the insurance proceeds and
to establish their right to the pension account. Donna defended on the
ground that, because both accounts constituted interests in employee
benefit plans that were federally regulated under ERISA, ERISA
preempted the Washington divorce revocation statute.
ERISA subjects private-sector employee benefit plans to a
variety of requirements designed to protect plan participants and
beneficiaries against the loss or forfeiture of promised benefits. 30 The
act imposes funding, benefit accrual, and vesting requirements on
pension plans, and it requires defined benefit pension plans to
participate in a federally administered insurance program, modeled on
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for banks, that will pay
most plan-promised benefits in the event of default. Further, ERISA
subjects all covered plans to reporting and disclosure obligations, and
to fiduciary standards for investing plan assets and administering plan
affairs. 3 1 In keeping with ERISA's central concern to prevent abuses
thirty-nine percent of all life insurance in force, amounting to $8.1 trillion in coverage. AM.
COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2012, at 65 (2012). The group life program

for federal employees that was involved in Hillman v. Maretta, discussed infra in text
accompanying note 84, was a contract with the Metropolitan Life Insurance company under which
the total amount of insurance in force as of 2010 was $824 billion. 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013)
(citing U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-94, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE
INSURANCE: RETIREMENT BENEFIT AND RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNT DISCLOSURES COULD BE
IMPROVED 1 (2011)).

29. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994), revoking any pre-divorce provision for a
spouse "in a nonprobate asset," defined in § 11.07.010(5)(a) to include "a life insurance policy,
employee benefit plan, annuity or similar contract, or individual retirement account."
30.

See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVIT PRATT & SUSAN STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT

LAW 146-47 (5th ed. 2010) (identifying agency risk, default risk, and forfeiture risk as the principal
concerns to which ERISA was directed). Regarding the origins and objectives of ERISA, see JAMES
A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY

(2004); Michael S. Gordon, "Ouerview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?," in U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL COMM.
ON AGING: THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25

(1984).
31.

For surveys of ERISA fiduciary law, see, e.g., PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES

OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 109-53 (2010); LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 30, at 541-

747.
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that would defeat the reliance of plan participants and beneficiaries
upon promised benefits, the statute contains language, emphasized by
the Court in Egelhoff,32 requiring that the terms of any ERISA-covered
plan "specify the basis on which payments are made to and from the
plan";33 and requiring the plan administrator to administer the plan "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan."34
The two beneficiary designations in which David named Donna were
executed in compliance with such ERISA plan terms.
ERISA contains a broadly worded preemption clause that
"supersede[s]" state laws that "relate to" any ERISA-covered plan. 3 5
After a troubled early case law,36 the Supreme Court has come to
interpret the "relate to" standard as balancing the interests of state law
with the purposes of ERISA. 37 The question in Egelhoff was whether
ERISA's preemption clause "supersede[d]" Washington's divorce
revocation statute. The Washington Supreme Court held not, reasoning
that the divorce revocation statute was tangential to the purposes of
ERISA because the statute "does not alter the nature of the plan itself,
the administrator's fiduciary duties, or the requirements for plan
administration." 38 The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision authored
by Justice Thomas, reversed on the ground that the Washington divorce
revocation statute requires the administrator of the ERISA-governed
plan to "pay benefits to the beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather
than to those identified in the plan document." 39 Because "this statute
governs the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan
administration," the Court was unwilling to see the divorce revocation

32. 532 U.S. at 147.
33. ERISA § 402(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4) (2012).
34. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). The Court in Egelhoff also pointed to
ERISA's definition of the term "beneficiary" as someone "designated by a plan participant, or by
the terms of [the] plan." 532 U.S. at 147 (quoting ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)).
35. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
36. Summarized in LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 30, at 830-49.
37. "'[W]e look both to 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state
law that Congress understood would survive,' as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law
on ERISA plans." Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (quoting New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995))).
Regarding the place of Egelhoff in the development of the Court's ERISA preemption case law, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA Preemption, and the Conundrum of the "Relate to" Clause,
91 TAx NOTES 1917 (2 0 0 1 ). Zelinsky reads ERISA's broad preemption language as creating a
presumption in favor of preemption of state law, contrary to the normal presumption against
preemption, but still rebuttable in circumstances in which the state interest is strong and the
intrusion on federal interests, if any, is slight.
38. In re Estate of Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80, 90 (Wash. 1999).
39. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
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statute as one "regulating 'areas where ERISA has nothing to say.' "40
Thus, the Court read ERISA to preempt the state law even though
ERISA, being wholly silent about divorce revocation, has literally
nothing to say about it.
The Court's contention that ERISA "governs the payment of
benefits, a central matter of plan administration," deserves careful
probing. The question that needs asking is whether ERISA should be
treated as governing every aspect of the payment of benefits, including
matters about which ERISA is silent, such as interpreting the meaning
of beneficiary designations. ERISA is a regulatory statute enacted to
protect promised benefits against forfeiture on account of overreaching
plan design or plan maladministration. ERISA was not designed to do
the interpretive work of state wealth transfer law, that is, to resolve
constructional problems concerning the transferor's intent. Such
problems abound. Which of two women claiming to be the decedent's
widow was his lawful spouse?4 1 Does the word "children" in an ERISAplan beneficiary designation include adopted children, if the plan terms
do not so say?4 2 Was the transferor of sound mind when he executed the
beneficiary designation, or did he lack capacity on account of illness or
duress? 4 3 State wealth transfer law addresses such questions.44 Justice
Breyer, dissenting in Egelhoff (for himself and Justice Stevens), pointed
to this dimension of the Washington divorce revocation statute, which
he characterized as "a rule of interpretation ... designed to carry out,
not to conflict with, the employee's likely intention as revealed in the
plan documents."4 5 The beneficiary designations in the plan documents
in Egelhoff say, "Pay Donna," but they do not address the question of
interpretation that Washington wealth transfer law does address,
which is whether the true meaning of that designation is, "Pay Donna,
except in the event that Donna and I should be divorced at the time of
40. Id. at 148 (quotingDillingham, 519 U.S. at 330).
41. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th
Cir. 2006) (applying Ohio law to ERISA-covered plan); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund
v. Gray, No. 02-CV-8381, 2003 WL 22339272, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2003) (applying Texas law to
ERISA-covered plan and explaining: "Because there is no federal domestic relations law and
marriage and divorce are traditional subjects of state regulation, we must look to state law to
determine [which of the two] is the 'surviving spouse' under the Plan." (citation omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Herring v. Campbell, No. 2-09-CV-30-TJW, 2010 WL 2640407 (E.D. Tex. June
30, 2010) (applying Texas law of equitable adoption in an ERISA case, rejecting Egelhoff-based
claim of preemption).
43. See, e.g, Tinsley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
federal common law governs claims of fraud and undue influence regarding an ERISA plan
beneficiary designation, because ERISA preempts state law).
44. See, e.g., PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 2.5(2) (status of adopted children for
purposes of succession); id. §§ 8.1-8.3 (2003) (capacity).
45. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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my death." Justice Breyer emphasized that "whether a designation that
(here explicitly) refers to a wife remains valid after divorce" is a
question that "[t]he documents themselves do not answer ... any more

than they describe what is to occur in a host of other special
circumstances (e.g., mental incompetence, intoxication, ambiguous
names, etc.)."4 6
Beyond the claim that fidelity to the terms of the two ERISA
plan documents required the result in Egelhoff, Justice Thomas offered
a functional justification for preempting the Washington divorce
revocation statute. He contended that the statute "interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration,"4 7 a value that the Court has
viewed as a goal of ERISA preemption.4 8 Preempting state law spares
plan administrators from having "to master the relevant laws of 50
states and to contend with litigation" about those laws.4 9 Dissenting,
Justice Breyer questioned whether looking up local constructional law
was particularly burdensome. He pointed out that plan "administrators
have to familiarize themselves with state law in any event when they
answer such routine legal questions as whether amounts due are
subject to garnishment, who is a 'spouse,' who qualifies as a 'child,' or
when an employee is legally dead."5 0 In aid of this process of consulting
state law, ERISA plans commonly contain a choice of law provision,
specifying which state's law governs state-law issues.
In connection with the objective of promoting "nationally
uniform" administration of ERISA-covered plans, the Court in Egelhoff
expressed concern to spare plan administrators from having to confront
"conflicting legal obligations" under different states' laws, for example,
in a case in which the ex-spouses live in different states. 5 1 Liability risk
in such cases is not, however, serious, because a plan faced with
uncertainty about the correct rule of law may and routinely does simply
interplead in federal court.52 Furthermore, stakeholder protection

46. Id. at 156.
47. Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
48. E.g., Fort Halifax Packing, Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
49. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149.
50. Id. at 157. Justice Breyer also pointed out that a plan sponsor wishing to spare the plan
from the supposed burden of having to refer to state divorce revocation law could simply impose a
divorce revocation rule as a plan term. Id.
51. Id. at 149.
52. Pursuant either to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22, or to the federal interpleader
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). Interpleader actions by ERISA plan stakeholders are quite
common; most of the slayer cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 144-46 and 148, were
framed as interpleader actions by the insurer or other stakeholder. Indeed, it has been held that
failure to interplead can constitute breach of ERISA's fiduciary duty of prudent plan
administration, ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(B). See Atwater v. Nortel Networks,
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against double payout is a commonplace of state divorce revocation law.
The Uniform Probate Code version provides that a payor "is not liable
for having made a payment . . . to a beneficiary designated in a
governing instrument affected by a divorce . . . before the

payor ... received written notice of the divorce." 53
In enacting ERISA, Congress could have included a
comprehensive body of constructional law to supplant the state laws
that normally do the work of interpreting transferors' intent in the
wealth transfer field. Congress did not do so. The inference that should
have been drawn from ERISA's silence on these matters is that
Congress did not intend to displace such state laws, especially in view
of "the presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state
regulation such as family law," 54 which the Court in Egelhoff
acknowledged but refused to follow. The Supreme Court has long
deferred to state law on questions of marital status. As the Court
explained in a 1956 case applying the state definition of "children" to a
question of federal copyright law:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that
its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law. This is especially
true where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic
relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.

ERISA now contains an express provision authorizing the
enforcement of state-court marital property decrees issued incident to
divorce (called qualified domestic relations orders, or "QDROs") against
ERISA-regulated pension accounts.56 This measure was added by
amendment in 1984,57 a decade after the initial enactment of ERISA.
During the decade during which ERISA was silent on the point, many
cases raised the question of whether ERISA's preemption and anti-

388 F. Supp. 2d 610 (M.D.N.C. 2005). For the view that interpleader procedure should be
discouraged in ERISA cases because it shifts litigation expenses to plan participants, see Albert
Feuer, Determining the Death Beneficiary Under an ERISA Plan and the Rights of Such a
Beneficiary, 54 BLOOMBERG TAx MGMT. MEM. (BNA) No. 323, at 16-19 (2013).
53. UPC § 2-804(g)(1). In such circumstances, the statute recognizes a restitutionary cause
of action, rendering the mistakenly paid ex-spouse "personally liable for the amount of the
payment . . . to the person who is entitled to it under" the divorce revocation statute. Id. § 2804(h)(1). The remedy is restitutionary because, under the divorce revocation statute, the exspouse was not entitled to the payment, and hence, even absent § 2-804(h)(1), the payment would
be recoverable under the common law of restitution as having been made under mistake of fact or
law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§6

(2011) (payment of

money not due) & cmt. c (mistake as to liability).
54. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152.
55. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (citations omitted).
56. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). The Internal Revenue Code contains a
conforming provision. See I.R.C. § 414(p) (2012).
57. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
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alienation provisions defeated such state-court decrees. The federal
courts all but unanimously enforced the state decrees.5 8 In the 1984
amendment providing for such enforcement, Congress effectively
ratified the federal-court consensus against preemption. Thus, in the
one circumstance in which Congress faced the choice between
preempting or enforcing state domestic relations law against ERISAregulated accounts, Congress chose not to preempt. The QDRO regime
pertains to the division of an employee's pension account during his or
her lifetime, and thus has had little bearing on beneficiary
designations; the QDRO regime does not apply at all to life insurance
accounts. Accordingly, the divorce revocation problem at issue in
Egelhoff did not come into discussion and was not addressed in the 1984
legislation, but the principle embodied in the QDRO regime-deference
to state law on marital property matters incident to divorce-invited
extension to state divorce revocation statutes, contrary to the Court's
decision in Egelhoff.
By treating ERISA as preempting the state-law solution to a
traditional state-law issue, Egelhoff disrespects the longstanding
allocation of responsibility between the two legal systems. Divorce
revocation is an issue about which federal law provides no direction and
expresses no federal interest ("there is no federal law of domestic
relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern"5 9 ). By
preventing state law from doing its customary work of interpreting the
meaning of beneficiary designations, federal preemption needlessly
defeats the core policy of wealth transfer law, to implement transferor's
intent.6 0 Preemption of state wealth transfer law is quite appropriate
in circumstances in which there is a significant federal interest. A
notable example of explicit (and principled) federal intervention in
family wealth transfer policy was the decision that Congress made in
another of its 1984 amendments to ERISA, mandating that certain

58. Regarding the pre-1984 case law and regulatory rulings rejecting defenses based on
ERISA's preemption and antialienation provisions, see LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note
30, at 857-58. The leading case, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1979), quoted with approval the view that Judge Weinfeld had expressed in an earlier such
case "that the 'generalized proscriptions' of ERISA's anti-alienation and assignment provision and
the statute's preemption clause were 'not sufficient to infer that Congress meant to preclude the
ancient family law right of maintenance and support and the issuance of process to enforce that
right.'" 592 F.2d at 122 (quoting Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
59. See De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 580 ("[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
primarily a matter of state concern.").
60. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 10.1, discussed supra text accompanying
note 19.
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pension annuities provide for minimum spousal shares. 6 1 Because
ERISA preempts state law relating to pension plans, such a reform
could only have been made by means of federal law. In Egelhoff, by
contrast (and in Hillman, as discussed next), the preemption of state
divorce revocation law was wholly destructive; principled state law was
suppressed even though federal law was wholly silent on the issue.
IV. POST-PREEMPTION PREEMPTION

A. Post-Distribution Relief
However deficient the reasoning in Egelhoff and however
unfortunate the result, the Court's 7-2 decision stands. Accordingly, at
the plan or account level, an ERISA-compliant beneficiary designation
preempts state divorce revocation law, and by inference, the same
principle applies to beneficiary designations in other types of financial
accounts that are federally created or regulated. Egelhoff did not,
however, address the further question of whether, once the federally
regulated account makes payment to the ex-spouse, the person(s)
entitled to take under the state divorce revocation statute could recover
the payment from the ex-spouse in an action based on state law. Actions
of this sort, which have come to be known as "post-distribution" claims,
are based on the premise that the purpose of preemption, as voiced in
Egelhoff, is to protect against state-law "interfer[ence] with nationally
uniform plan administration." 6 2 Accordingly, once account-level
distribution has been made to the person named in the federally
regulated beneficiary designation, the federal interest is satisfied, and
there is no federal interest in intruding on the operation of state wealth
transfer law as regards the ultimate entitlement to the asset.
A decade before Egelhoff, the drafters of the Uniform Probate
Code's divorce revocation measure foresaw the risk of ERISA
preemption 63 and undertook to facilitate the post-distribution relief in
that event. The Code provides that the ex-spouse who receives the
account payment is "personally liable for the amount of the
payment ... to the person who would have been entitled to it were [the
state divorce revocation statute] not preempted." 64 The theory of such
61. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Regarding the requirement that pension annuities take
joint and survivor form, see LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 30, at 285-94; WIEDENBECK,
supra note 31, at 250-54.
62. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
63. The official comment explains the drafters' concern that ERISA's "extraordinarily broad"
preemption clause might result in preemption of state divorce revocationlaw. UPC § 2-804 cmt.
64. Id. § 2-804(h)(2).
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post-distribution recovery is restitutionary: an account-level payment
has been made for the purpose of federal-level administrative
convenience to a person who, as a matter of state wealth transfer law,
is not entitled to it, and who should therefore be required to disgorge it
to prevent unjust enrichment.6 5 The post-distribution remedy is a
statutory version of the ancient equitable remedy of constructive
trust, 66 a type of remedy that the Supreme Court has held in other
settings to be authorized under ERISA's enforcement provision for
"appropriate equitable relief."67
In the years after Egelhoff, post-distribution relief was awarded
in several cases arising in consequence of ERISA's QDRO regime,
previously mentioned, 6 8 which allows a state-court marital property
decree to be enforced against an ERISA pension account, but subject to
the condition that the state decree satisfy certain particulars of content
and description designed to ease the burden of compliance for plan
administration.6 9 Cases recurrently arise in which a divorcing spouse
secures a marital property settlement or state-court decree that
purports to govern an ERISA plan account but that neglects to satisfy
the QDRO rules and is thus unenforceable against the plan. The
Supreme Court dealt with such a case in Kennedy v. PlanAdministrator

for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan.70 The divorcing couple had
agreed to a marital property settlement under which the wife waived
her interest in the husband's pension account. He later died without
having altered the beneficiary designation on the account that named

65. "If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as between claimant and
defendant) the claimant has a better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled to restitution
from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 48

(2011).

66. For discussion of the post-distribution remedy in divorce-revocation legislation as
imposing a form of statutory constructive trust, see Sarabeth A Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About
in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result
Regarding ERISA-Governed Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373-97 (2007). As
codified in the Restatement, a constructive trust arises when "a defendant is unjustly enriched by
the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation of the
claimant's rights"; in such circumstances, "the defendant may be declared a constructive trustee,
for the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question and its traceable product." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 55(1)

(2011).

67. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical
Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006), an ERISA-regulated health insurance plan paid medical
expenses on behalf of the Sereboffs, who were insured plan participants. The plan contained a
subrogation clause entitling the insurer to reimbursement for such payments in the event of a
subsequent tort recovery. The Court sustained the insurer's right to "a constructive trust or
equitable lien," which the Court called a " 'familiar rul[e] of equity.' " Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
68. Supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
69. See ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3); I.R.C. § 414(p), 26 U.S.C. § 414(p).
70. 555 U.S. 285, 285-86 (2009).
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the now-ex-wife as the death beneficiary. The husband's estate claimed
the proceeds, relying on her waiver. The Supreme Court held that
ERISA required the plan to pay the benefit to the ex-wife "in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan."7 1
The decision in Kennedy resolved the question of the plan's duty
to make distribution in accordance with the beneficiary designation, but
the Court expressly left open the question, which had not been raised
in that case, of post-distribution relief. The Court framed the latter
question as "whether the [husband's] Estate could have brought an
action in state or federal court against [the ex-wife] to obtain the
benefits after they were distributed."7 2 In such a case, the husband's
estate would be seeking to recover from the ex-wife the amount that she
received from the pension account, presumably as the disgorgement
remedy to correct for her breach of her state-law-governed agreement
to waive her claim to that account.
Just such a claim was raised in Estate of Kensinger v. URL
Pharma,Inc., 7 3 a Third Circuit case decided in 2012 on facts that the
court regarded as "virtually identical to"74 Kennedy. The court held for
the husband's estate, reasoning that "to the extent that ERISA is
concerned with the expeditious payment of plan proceeds to
beneficiaries, permitting suits against beneficiaries after benefits have
been paid does not implicate any concern of expeditious payment or
undermine any core objective of ERISA."75 Kensinger relied upon
several state-court opinions holding similarly, including an Oklahoma
case explaining that "the pension plan funds were no longer entitled to
ERISA protection once the plan funds were distributed."76 In Andochick
v. Byrd,77 a case on "facts nearly identical"7 8 to Kensinger (and
Kennedy), the Fourth Circuit followed Kensinger, concluding that
"ERISA does not preempt post-distribution suits against ERISA
beneficiaries."79

71. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D), cited in Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300.
72. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299 n.10.
73. 674 F.3d 131, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2012).
74. Id. at 133.
75. Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted).
76. Id. at 137 (citing Pardee v. Pardee, 112 P.3d 308, 315-16 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004)). The
court also cited Alcorn v. Appleton, 708 S.E.2d 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011), and Sweebe v. Sweebe, 712
N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 2006). Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 137.
77. 709 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 235 (2013).
78. 709 F.3d at 299.
79. Id. at 301. In so deciding, the court thought it was "adopt[ing] the same view as every
published appellate opinion to address the question." Id. (citing cases). The court overlooked one
contrary decision, Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D. Mass. 2010); see also McMorrow v.
Langevin, No. 10-P-1591, 2011 WL 2436748, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. June 20, 2011) (endorsing
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B. Hillman
Three months after the Fourth Circuit decision in Andochick,
the Supreme Court decided Hillman v. Maretta,80 preempting statelaw-authorized post-distribution relief against an ex-spouse who took
under a federally regulated beneficiary designation. Although Hillman
was not an ERISA case, the Court's 8-0 opinion will inevitably be
treated as governing in ERISA cases as well. Hillman effectively
abrogates Kensinger and Andochick, and it will preclude state-lawbased post-distribution relief against the unjustly enriched ex-spouse
in any case in which that ex-spouse takes under a federally created or
federally regulated beneficiary designation.
Hillman featured garden-variety divorced-beneficiary facts. In
1996 Warren Hillman designated his then-spouse Judy Maretta as the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company. Warren and Judy divorced in 1998. In 2002
Warren married Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008 Warren died, having
never revised the beneficiary designation naming Judy. These events
took place in Virginia, which has a divorce revocation statute that
would have struck Judy's interest had Warren purchased his insurance
from the Metropolitan in the form of an individual policy. 8 1 But Warren,
a federal civilian employee, 8 2 purchased the insurance under a group
policy made available through a program established by a federal
statute, the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act
("FEGLIA"). 83 The federal Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")
administers FEGLIA beneficiary claims. Warren's ex-spouse Judy, the
designated beneficiary, and Jacqueline, Warren's widow, both claimed
the policy proceeds. OPM ordered the benefits paid to Judy "because
she had been named as the beneficiary."8 4
Jacqueline then sued Judy in Virginia state court to recover the
proceeds. The parties stipulated that, under existing precedent, the core
Virginia divorce revocation statute was preempted. What remained in
Staelens in dicta but finding that the language of the marital property decree in question did not
entitle the claimant to the nonprobate account).

80.

133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).

81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (2012).
82. Although the insurance was provided through an employee benefit plan, the plan was
ERISA-exempt. See ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. 1003(b) (excluding governmental plans). In cases
involving an ERISA-exempt employee benefit plan that is not otherwise subject to federal
preemption, state divorce revocation law applies. See, e.g., Stillman v. TIAA-CREF, 343 F.3d 1311
(10th Cir. 2003), in which the Utah divorce revocation statute was applied to a beneficiary
designation in a pension account arising under the ERISA-exempt plan of a state university.

83. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (2012).
84.

133 S. Ct. at 1949.
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dispute was a further provision of the Virginia statute, authorizing
post-distribution relief in the event of preemption. The statute renders
an ex-spouse who receives such a payment "personally liable for the
amount of the payment to the person who would have been entitled to
it" had the divorce revocation statute not been preempted. 85 The trial
court sustained Jacqueline's action for post-distribution relief, but the
Virginia Supreme Court held the measure preempted, and the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor.
Justice Sotomayor took as her starting point the statutory text
authorizing the FEGLIA program, which provides that an insured
employee's death benefit is to be paid "to the beneficiary ... designated
by the employee," or if none survives, to the employee's widow, children,
or other relatives in a statutorily prescribed order8 6 that is functionally
comparable to a state-law intestacy regime.8 7 To decide the preemption
question, the Court saw itself required to discern the purpose 8 8 of this
language
that
the
death
benefit
be
paid
"to
the
beneficiary ... designated by the employee." The widow who would take
under the Virginia post-distribution statute contended (echoing the
rationale in Egelhoff) that "Congress' purpose in enacting FEGLIA was
to advance administrative convenience by establishing a clear rule to
dictate where the Government should direct insurance proceeds."8 9 The
Court conceded "some force" to this view, and acknowledged that if
administrative convenience had been "Congress' only purpose, then
there might be no conflict between [the Virginia post-distribution
provision] and FEGLIA" because the Virginia "cause of action takes
effect only after benefits have been paid."9 0 But the Court concluded
that administrative convenience was not the sole purpose of the
FEGLIA provision. Rather, Congress had the further purpose of seeing
to it that "the insurance proceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary
and that the beneficiary can use them."9 1 This assertion decided the
case, by supplying the premise for the Court's decision that Virginia's

85. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(D) (2012).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), summarized in Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1947-48. Like a state intestacy
statute, FEGLIA's list of statutory takers is a default regime meant to reflect common intent,
applicable only in the circumstance in which the insured has neglected to specify particular
primary and contingent beneficiaries.
87. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1947-48. Regarding the patterns of intestate distribution, see
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 2.1-2.4.
88. "This case raises a question of purposes and objectives pre-emption." 133 S. Ct. at 1950.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1953.
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post-distribution provision "interferes with Congress' objective that
insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary." 9 2
Remarkably, the Court was unable to point to any mention of
this supposed Congressional "objective" in the statutory text or other
legislative materials. Instead, the Court read FEGLIA's silence on the
divorce revocation rule as an indication that Congress disfavored the
rule. Providing a remedy for divorce revocation, the Court said, was "not
the judgment that Congress made. Rather . . . Congress established a
clear and predictable procedure for an employee to indicate who the
intended beneficiary of his life insurance shall be." 93 In this way, the
Court treated the failure of Congress to address a traditional topic of
state wealth transfer law as importing a "judgment" that Congress
meant to preclude consulting state wealth transfer law when construing
the meaning of a beneficiary designation, although federal courts have
routinely turned to state constructional law on other questions of
marital status arising under FEGLIA.9 4 The far more likely explanation
for FEGLIA's silence on divorce revocation is that Congress gave no
thought to such routine matters of state wealth transfer law, regarding
them as not germane to the officially expressed purpose of FEGLIA,
which was "to provide low-cost group life insurance to Federal
employees." 9 5
Like ERISA, 9 6 FEGLIA contains an express statutory provision,
section 8705(e), authorizing the enforcement of state-court marital
property decrees issued incident to divorce.9 7 As with ERISA's QDRO
regime, section 8705(e) is the one circumstance in which Congress
contemplated the effect of divorce on a FEGLIA account, and as in
ERISA, Congress chose to defer to state law, not to preempt it. Because
the principle underlying section 8705(e) is deference to state law on
FEGLIA marital property matters arising from divorce, the Supreme
Court in Hillman could easily have treated state divorce revocation
statutes as falling within that policy. Instead, the Court read the failure
of section 8705(e) to deal with divorce revocation as evidencing

92. Id. at 1955.
93. Id. at 1952.
94. For example, on the question of which of two claimants was the lawful spouse of a
FEGLIA insured, see MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. u. Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying
Connecticut law); Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying California law).
95. H.R. Rep. No. 83-2579, at 1 (2d Sess. 1954), quoted by the Court, 133 S. Ct. at 1947.
Regarding the economics of group insurance, see supranote 28.
96. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), discussed supra text accompanying notes 56-

58.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(e).
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Congressional intent to restrict the measure to its "precise
conditions."9 8
Justice Thomas, concurring in the result in Hillman, resisted
the Court's purported inquiry into the statutory purpose. He saw no
need to "lookH beyond the text," because "the ordinary meanings of
FEGLIA and [the Virginia post-distribution provision] directly
conflict."99 This attitude toward the work of interpreting governing
language exemplifies the "plain meaning" fallacy that Wigmore
discredited long ago, and which the Restatement of Property has
repudiated for wealth transfer law. 100 Commenting on the
interpretation of documents, Wigmore spoke of the "truth ... that words
always need interpretation."1 0 1 What Justice Thomas calls the
"ordinary meaning" in this case is the meaning that has been rejected
by every American legislature that has considered the question of
whether a transferor is likely to have intended a spousal beneficiary
designation to remain in effect in the event the parties subsequently

divorce. 102
C. Wissner and Ridgway
Why did the Court strain to treat Congress as having addressed
a topic about which Congress in fact had been silent? One factor that
appears to have motivated the Court was the wish to avoid disturbing
two older precedents, Wissner v. Wissner,103 decided in 1950, and
Ridgway v. Ridgway,104 from 1981, cases dealing with beneficiary
designations under federal statutes providing life insurance programs
for military personnel. In each case, a sharply divided Court "preempted state laws that mandated a different distribution of benefits." 105
98. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1953 n.5.
99. Id. at 1955 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100. "The plain-meaning rule is archaic because it unduly stresses a supposed ordinary
meaning of the words employed." PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 10.2 cmt. b. Under
the Restatement rule, a court may consult evidence of meaning extrinsic to the text of the donative
document. In divorce-revocation cases, there commonly is no such evidence, in which case the
divorce-revocation rule governs as a rule of construction. See id. § 11.3(a) ("An ambiguity to which
a rule of construction applies is resolved by the rule of construction, unless evidence establishes
that the donor had a different intention.").
101. 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2470, at 227 (3d ed. 1940). Regarding the construction of documents,
Wigmore wrote that the plain meaning "is simply the meaning of the people who did not write the
document." Id. § 2462, at 191.
102. Regarding the state statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 11-13, 22-23.
103. 338 U.S. 655, 655 (1950).
104. 454 U.S. 46, 46 (1981).
105. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013).
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In Hillman the Court concluded that Wissner and Ridgway
"govern[ed],"10 6 although neither Wissner nor Ridgway concerned
divorce revocation or comparable state constructional law.
In Wissner, the insured, who was killed in military service, had
designated his mother as the death beneficiary on the insurance policy.
In a California state-court action, his widow claimed a half interest in
the proceeds under California community property law on the ground
that the insured had purchased the policy from funds that belonged half
to her. The California Supreme Court sustained her claim, but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, in a 5-3 opinion by Justice Clark, holding the
widow's claim preempted. The federal statute creating the insurance
program provided beneficiary- designation and revocation features of
the sort common to virtually all life insurance policies, specifying that
the insured "shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or
beneficiaries of the insurance .

.

. and shall .

.

. at all times have the

right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries."1 0 7 The Supreme Court
treated these boilerplate designation terms as the basis for holding that
the widow's claim was preempted. The Court said that these terms
showed that "Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing
that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other."108
Accordingly, the widow's California community property right had to be
preempted because enforcing it would "substitute[] the widow for the
mother, who was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the
insurance money."10 9
The Court's phrase, "and no other," would prove to be an
influential rhetorical flourish, quoted twice in Ridgwayo10 and again
decades later in Hillman,111 but it entailed a large and quite
unsupported extension of meaning. In state wealth transfer law, where
beneficiary designations are routinely encountered and interpreted,
they are subjected to constructional principles that sometimes do
substitute others. For example, the antilapse statute provides for
alternative takers, commonly descendants, in certain circumstances in
which the designated beneficiary predeceases the transferor.112 Another
notable example, discussed further in Part V of this Article, is the slayer

106. "These precedents accordingly govern our analysis of the relationship between [the
Virginia post-distribution statute] and FEGLIA in this case." Id. at 1951.
107. National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, then cited as 38 U.S.C. § 802(g), quoted in
Wissner, 338 U.S. at 658.
108. 338 U.S. at 658 (emphasis supplied).
109. 338 U.S. at 659, quoted in Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950.
110. 454 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1981).
111. 133 S. Ct. at 1951.
112. See, e.g., PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 5.5; UPC §§ 2-603, 2-706.
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rule, which applies in circumstances in which a transferor is feloniously
slain by a person whom the transferor has designated as a devisee or
beneficiary. In such cases, state law denies the slayer any benefit by
substituting other takers. 113 Thus, as a description of the effect of
beneficiary designation language in then-current American practice,
the "no other" remark in Wissner was wrong. If the claim was that
Congress meant to depart from that practice, the Court pointed to no
evidence of such a divergent meaning.
Dissenting in Wissner for Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and
himself, Justice Minton challenged the majority's reasoning in giving
preemptive force to the federal statute's provision for the insured to
designate beneficiaries: "Fully to respect the right which Congress gave
the serviceman to designate his beneficiary does not require disrespect
of settled family law." 114 The dissenters would have enforced the
widow's state-law right, under which she was "the owner of a half
portion of these proceeds because such proceeds are the fruits of funds
originally hers" under state law. 115 Indeed, Justice Minton insisted: "I
cannot believe that Congress intended to say to a serviceman, 'You may
take your wife's property and purchase a policy of insurance payable to
your mother, and we will see that your defrauded wife gets none of the
money.' "116

In Ridgway the insured serviceman, identified as Sergeant
Ridgway, and his wife April were Maine domiciliaries. The couple
divorced. The Maine divorce decree included a term ordering the
insured to designate his three children as beneficiaries of the life
insurance policy and to keep the policy in effect for them. Months after
the divorce, Sergeant Ridgway remarried. In violation of the divorce
decree, he revised the beneficiary designation on the policy to name
Donna, the new wife.11 7 On his death, state-court proceedings ensued.
Donna claimed the policy proceeds as designated beneficiary. April,
suing on behalf of the three children, sought to have Donna declared a
constructive trustee over the proceeds for the children in accord with
the divorce decree, a state-law remedy that, as the Maine Supreme

113. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29, 134.
114. 338 U.S. at 663.
115. Id. at 662.
116. Id. at 663-64.
117. Sergeant Ridgway did this by "chang[ing] the policy's beneficiary designation
to... direct[] that its proceeds be paid as specified'by law,'" thereby invoking "the statutory order
of beneficiary precedence" under which "the policy proceeds, in the event of Ridgway's death, would
be paid to his 'widow,'that is, his'lawful spouse ... at the time of his death.'" Ridgway v. Ridgway,
454 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
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Court remarked below, is a commonly granted remedy on such facts. 118
The insurance carrier under the federal program paid the funds into
court.
The Maine Supreme Court held for April, reasoning that the
federally authorized beneficiary designation process "does not reflect
any federal interest in permitting a serviceman to evade the
responsibility to provide for his minor children imposed both by virtue
of his voluntary agreement and by the express provision of a valid state
court decree." 119 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 opinion by
Justice Blackmun, holding the case "controlled by Wissner."12 0 As in
Wissner, the main ground of decision was the insured's compliance with
beneficiary designation procedures contained in the federal statute that
established the insurance program. Dissenting, Justice Stevens
responded that "[t]he right to designate the beneficiary of an insurance
policy is a common feature in insurance contracts. It surely is not a right
that can be characterized as uniquely federal in any sense." 12 1
Accordingly, he observed, "the mere fact that the right has its source in
a federal statute does not require that it be given a construction
different from that given a comparable right created by state law or by
private contract." 122
I have emphasized the dissents in Wissner and Ridgway, which
appear to me to have been better reasoned, but even if those cases were
correctly decided, the Court in Hillman decades later could easily have
distinguished both. 123 Neither Wissner nor Ridgway dealt with the
divorce revocation problem. Moreover, the state-law claims asserted in
Wissner and Ridgway were not, as is the divorce revocation rule, intent-

118. See Ridgway v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 419 A2d 1030, 1031 (Me. 1980) (citing state
cases). Apparently unaware of the tension with Ridgway, the Sixth Circuit in 2000 applied
Michigan law in a similar case involving ERISA-plan insurance benefits, holding "that once the
benefits . . . have been distributed according to the plan documents, ERISA does not preempt the
imposition of a constructive trust on those benefits." Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund
v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2000); accord Bd. of Trs. of the Ind. State Council of
Plasters & Cement Masons Pension Fund v. Sheline, No. 1: 12-CV-447, 2013 WL 408812, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2013) (affirming the holding in Howell). Regarding the constructive trust as
an equitable remedy, see supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
119. Ridgway, 419 A.2d at 1035, quoted in Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 53.
120. 454 U.S. at 55.
121. Id. at 67.
122. Id.
123. Another ground of distinction, which was argued to the Court in Hillman, was that the
federal statutes in Wissner and Ridgway, unlike that in Hillman, contained express antiattachment provisions restricting the enforcement of third-party claims. The Court brusquely
dismissed "[t]hese discussions of the anti-attachment provisions" as "alternative grounds to
support the judgment in each case, and not necessary components of the holdings." 133 S. Ct. 1943,
1954 (2013).
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implementing rules of construction. 12 4 Rather, the claim in each was
intent-defeating-that a state-created right, arising prior to the time
that the insured executed the beneficiary designation, should prevail
against the insured's expression of intent in the federally authorized
beneficiary designation. In both Wissner and Ridgway, the transferor
intended to benefit the persons he designated. The premise of the
divorce revocation statutes that the Court preempted in Egelhoff and
Hillman is that the transferor does not wish to benefit the designated
beneficiary when divorce has supervened.
V. THE SLAYER BENEFICIARY AND THE IMPULSE TO FEDERAL
COMMON LAW

A pervasive feature of state wealth transfer law is the rule
forbidding the beneficiary who feloniouslyl 25 slays the transferor from
taking any benefit under a will or nonprobate beneficiary designation
naming the slayer. 126 The slayer rule is codified in the Restatements of
Property1 27 and Restitution, 128 and in the Uniform Probate Code. 129
(The Code's slayer provisions are closely modeled on its divorce
revocation rule, making comparable arrangements for post-distribution
relief in the event of federal preemption, 130 and for protecting the
insurer or other stakeholder who makes good faith payment to the
slayer, unaware of the slayer's wrongdoing. 131) The slayer rule is largely
intent-implementing in effect because the transferor would seldom
want his or her slayer to benefit. Nevertheless, the rule is mandatory.
The transferor is forbidden to countermand it,132 because the rule
124. Regarding the intent-implementing character of the divorce-revocation rule, see supra
text accompanying notes 14-18.
125. Regarding the intent standard, the relation between civil and criminal liability in slayer
cases, and the corresponding evidentiary requirements, see PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supranote
11, § 8.4(b), cmts. d-h.
126. Citations to state statutes are collected, id. § 8.4 reporter's note 1.
127. Id. § 8.4.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

45 (2011) (slayer

rule); see also id. § 3 ("A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.").
129. UPC § 2-803.
130. Id. § 2-803(i)(2). The official comment to the subsection explains that the provision is
meant to function in the event of ERISA preemption. Id. cmt.
131. Id. § 2-803(i)(1).
132. Compare, for example, the Uniform Probate Code divorce-revocation rule, UPC § 2-804(b),
which commences with a proviso permitting contraindication ("Except as provided by the express
terms of a governing instrument . . ."), with UPC § 2-803(b), the slayer rule, which contains no
such term. In two states, Wisconsin and Louisiana, the slayer statutes do allow the transferor to
countermand the rule. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

137 (9th ed. 2013), discussing WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(b) (2012); and LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 941,
943, 945 (permitting "reconciliation with or forgiveness by the decedent" to defeat the slayer rule).

2014]

PREEMPTION OF WEALTH TRANSFER LAW

1689

enforces an overriding principle of public policy that the law will not
assist a wrongdoer to profit from the wrong. 133
Neither ERISA nor FEGLIA, the federal statutes that were held
to preempt state wealth transfer law in Egelhoff and Hillman
respectively, addresses the slayer problem, even though slayer cases are
sadly common1 34 (further evidence that Congress had no interest in
disturbing the preexisting system of wealth transfer law when making
provision for federally created or regulated beneficiary designations).
Because the statutes are silent, under the literalist reasoning in
Egelhoff and Hillman the designated beneficiary who slays an ERISA
or FEGLIA insured would stand to collect the insurance proceeds.
Recall the justification that Justice Thomas offered for preempting the
state divorce revocation statute in Egelhoff-that the statute
impermissibly requires the administrator of the ERISA-governed plan
to "pay benefits to the beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather than to
those identified in the plan documents." 13 5 That is exactly what a state
slayer statute does. Similarly, in Hillman, the rationale for denying
effect to Virginia's post-distribution divorce revocation remedy was that
it "interferes with Congress' objective that insurance proceeds belong to
the named beneficiary." 136 So does the Virginia slayer statute. Hillman
repeated the line from Wissner that Congress has "direct[ed] that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other." 13 7 The slayer
statutes, however, always award the proceeds to someone other than
the slayer.
Justice Breyer's dissent in Egelhoff pointed out that divorce
revocation statutes are "virtually indistinguishable" from slayer
statutes, because both " 'gover[n] the payment of benefits, a central
matter of plan administration.' " 138 This objection was unanswerable,

133. This point is discussed in PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 8.4 cmt. B (1999).
134. The vast case law is collected in Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Homicide as Precluding
Taking under Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787 (1983); and F. S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of
Insured by Beneficiary as Affecting Life Insuranceor Its Proceeds,27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1969). "In 2011,
in incidents of murder for which the relationships of murder victims and offenders were
known,... 24.8 percent of victims were slain by family members .... Of the female murder victims
for whom the relationships to their offenders were known, 36.5 percent were murdered by their
husbands or boyfriends." Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2011,
Expanded Homicide Data, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (Sept. 2012), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/offenses-known-tolaw-enforcement/expanded/expanded-homicide-data, archived at http://perma.cc/BK8R-XM4W.
135. 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
136. 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013).
137. Id. at 1951 (quoting Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950)).
138. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159-60, quoting the majority, id. at 148. Justice Breyer's position
is developed in Katherine A. McAllister, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA
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and the Court largely refused to engage with it. The slayer statutes "are
not before us," said Justice Thomas in reply, "so we do not decide the
issue." 139 As dictum, however, he observed that because slayer statutes
are so common and "more or less uniform" among the states, "their
interference with the aims of ERISA is at least debatable." 14 0 In truth,
there is considerable variety in the provisions of state slayer statutes,1 4 1
whereas divorce revocation statutes are much more uniform. Moreover,
even had Justice Thomas been correct in thinking that the state slayer
statutes are "more or less uniform," he would still have had no answer
to the point that state slayer statutes, like state divorce revocation
statutes, require the plan to do precisely what Justice Thomas in
Egelhoff said that ERISA forbids-"pay benefits to the beneficiaries
chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the plan

documents." 14 2
The Supreme Court long ago endorsed the policy merits of the
slayer rule, saying that "[i]t would be a reproach to the jurisprudence
of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on the
death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken."14 3 Federal courts
faced with ERISA slayer cases before Egelhoff applied state slayer
statutes.14 4 Likewise, federal courts have applied state slayer law in
Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce and Slayer
Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1483-1513 (2011).
139. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152. In Kennedy, the Court again refused to consider the tension
with slayer statutes. 555 U.S. 285, 304 n.14 (2009). The issue was also raised in Ridgway, in which
the majority refused to engage with it. See 454 U.S. 46, 60 n.9 (1981) ("Our ruling on a situation
of that kind is reserved for another day."). In Egelhoff, immediately preceding the language quoted
in text, Justice Thomas summarized the argument based on the state slayer statutes, that "[i]n
the ERISA context, these 'slayer' statutes could revoke the beneficiary status of someone who
murdered a plan participant." 532 U.S. at 152. Some courts have read this language of summary
as meaning to endorse nonpreemption of state slayer statutes. See, e.g., Nale v. Ford Motor Co.
UAW Retirement Plan, 703 F. Supp. 2d 714, 722 (E.D. Mich 2010) (reasoning that the Court's
silence "suggest[s] that ERISA would not preempt state slayer statutes"); and cases cited infra
note 148. That interpretation is not supportable, however, because of the Court's insistence in the
next sentence that " [t]hose statutes are not before us, so we do not decide the issue." Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 152.
140. Id.
141. Among the issues on which the slayer statutes diverge is the extent to which they reach
all nonprobate transfers; how they treat joint tenancies; the preclusive effect of criminal conviction,
especially for less culpable forms of homicide; and whether the slayer's descendants are also
prevented from taking. For discussion, see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 132, at 137-38;
and Albert Feuer, Who Is Entitled to Benefits from ERISA Plans?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 919,
1049-50 (2007).
142. 532 U.S. at 147.
143. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (federal common law before Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
144. The first reported case, Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees of Division 1181, A.T UNew
York Employees Pension Fund & Plan, held that "a state law prohibiting a killer from profiting
from her crime is not preempted by ERISA." 709 F. Supp. 329, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New

2014]

PREEMPTION OF WEALTH TRANSFER LAW

1691

FEGLIA cases.14 5 In some of these cases, the courts remarked that even
if the state law were preempted, federal common law would have
supplied an alternative ground of decision.1 4 6 The Supreme Court has
in other settings recognized the need for the courts "to develop a 'federal
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans.' " 147 Following Egelhoff it has become common in slayer cases to
invoke both grounds14 8 or to rest the result solely on federal common
law.14 9 In 2011 the Department of Veterans Affairs promulgated a
slayer rule for federal military insurance programs, 15 0 which the
York law). "This common law rule is rooted in public policy and has broad application to insurance
policies, wills and intestacy." Id. Mendez-Bellido was followed in Administrative Committee for the
H.E.B. Investment & Retirement Plan v. Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (E.D. Tex. 2002)
(applying Texas slayer law but noting as an alternative ground that federal common law would
apply); New OrleansElectrical PensionFund v. Newman, 784 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (E.D. La. 1992)
(applying Louisiana slayer law); and New Orleans Electrical Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F.
Supp. 845, 849-51 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding Louisiana slayer law not preempted but observing as
an alternative ground that federal common law would apply). A post-Egelhoff case applying state
slayer law to an ERISA-governed insurance plan is First NationalBank & Trust Co. ofMountain
Home v. StonebridgeLife InsuranceCo., 619 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying Arkansas law).
145. E.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Rupe, 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table
decision) (applying California slayer law). In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. u. White, the court
applied Texas slayer law but said that federal common law would supply an alternative ground.
972 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Yohey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 507 U.S. 977
(1993).
146. White, 972 F.2d at 124; Harris,217 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62; DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. at 84951.
147. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (citation omitted),
endorsed in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993). See generally Jeffrey A.
Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 541, 542-604 (1998)
(surveying case law as of 1998).
148. "Since Egelhoff, several district courts considering this issue have reasoned that, based
on the dicta in Egelhoff," discussed supra note 139, "it is likely that ERISA does not preempt state
slayer statues, but that it is unnecessary to determine the preemption issue since federal common
law provides the same result as a slayer statute." Honeywell Say. & Ownership Plan v. Jicha, No.
08-4265 (DRD), 2010 WL 276237, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010); accord Estate of Burklund v. Burklund (In
re Estate ofBurklund), No. 11-5024, 2013 WL 327622, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. 2013). One court declined
to "address the question of whether federal common law or the law of some state supplies the rule
of decision," because "[t]he law seems to be the same virtually everywhere and thus there is no
conflict." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Little, No. 13-CV-1059 (BMC), 2013 WL 4495684, at *3 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2013).
149. E.g., Ahmedv. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (ERISA case), discussed
in Peter S. Lin, Murdering the Slayer Statute Under the Pretense of ERISA Preemption:Ahmed v.
Ahmed, 58 TAX L. 767, 772-79 (2005); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 138082 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (applying federal common law to a slayer case arising under the federal
insurance program that was at issue in Ridgway). Regarding the place of the doctrine in the law
of federal jurisdiction, see Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585 (2006). As regards ERISA, the Supreme Court has read the legislative
history to say that Congress "expect[ed]" that the federal courts would develop "a federal common
law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
150. 38 C.F.R. § 9.5(e) (2014).
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Department described as "[t]he Federal common-law slayer's rule."1 5 1
No reported ERISA or FEGLIA case has ever allowed the slayer to

take. 152
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the slayer problem in
beneficiary designation cases arising under federally created or
federally regulated wealth transfer regimes such as ERISA or FEGLIA.
There is no reason to think that the Court will allow slayers to profit
from homicide in the name of federal preemption. Either the Court will
decline to preempt state slayer law, or the Court will develop a slayer
rule as federal common law. Neither solution is consistent with the
Wissner-derived rationale of Hillman, that wealth passing under a
federally regulated beneficiary designation "belong[s] to the named
beneficiary and no other." 153 The more likely choice is federal common
law, which aligns with Egelhoffs emphasis on the efficiency of
"nationally uniform plan administration." 154 Federalization permits but
does not assure uniformity because, unless and until the Supreme
Court (or Congress) does the federalizing, disagreements can form
among the federal courts about whether and what to federalize. 15 5
The trend toward a federal common law slayer rule invites the
question, why not also preserve the divorce revocation rule as federal
common law? To be sure, the slayer rule has a moral imperative more
pronounced than the intent-implementing policy of the divorce
revocation rule. Both rules share the common purpose of preventing
151. Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance and Veterans' Group Life Insurance-Slayer's
Rule Exclusion, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,455, 77,455 (Dec. 13, 2011).
152. For an extreme literalist view of the reach of ERISA's requirement that plan benefits be
distributed "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan," ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D), see Feuer, supra note 141, at 1048-59, arguing that
ERISA not only preempts state slayer laws but also precludes federal common law, hence that the
slayer must be allowed to take under an ERISA-covered benefit designation. For the view that the
slayer rule should not apply in cases in which the slayer had suffered severe domestic abuse at the
hands of the victim, or in cases in which the slayer's conduct resulted in material part from mental
illness, see Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn't Inherit from Their Victims-Or Should They?, 48 GA.
L. REV. 145, 215-226 (2013).
153. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1951 (2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950)).
154. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
155. Commentators have suggested that in the wealth transfer field, such problems can be
minimized by looking to the provisions of the PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, and the
Uniform Probate Code as models. See, e.g., David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal
Common Law for ERISA-Preempted Beneficiary Designations, 28 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE, 29, 51-54 (Fall 2002); accord T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 195-96 (2004). For the view that following Restatement rules "further[s] the
interest in achieving uniformity in the articulation of federal common law," see United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying joint and several liability
standards from the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the common law of a federal environmental
statute).
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unjust enrichment. As previously noticed, 15 6 the divorce revocation rule
is an uncontested principle of state wealth transfer law, in the sense
that no state probate code that addresses the problem chooses a
contrary rule. Compared to Egelhoff and Hillman, which defeat the
divorce revocation rule, a federal common law rule that enforces the
divorce revocation principle would surely be preferable.
Supplanting state wealth transfer law with duplicative federal
common law is a technique that has no natural stopping point, and in
the wake of Egelhoff and Hillman, the pressure to create more federal
common law will increase. It is, however, a mistake to assume that
federal common law responds effectively to the concern (which was the
Supreme Court's ostensible rationale for preempting the divorce
revocation statute in Egelhof) that state law "interferes with nationally
uniform plan administration."1 57 Differences among the federal courts
about how to formulate federal common law on a particular point can
arise and remain unresolved for long years. 15 8 Although the Supreme
Court in Egelhoff justified preemption on the ground of sparing plan
administrators from having "to master the relevant laws of 50
states," 159 in practice looking up local law on a point will often be easier
than trying to decide which strand of federal common law might find
favor with the particular federal court that reviews the plan's decision.
Another means of federalizing traditionally state-law rules such
as divorce revocation or the slayer rule is for the sponsors of federally
created or federally regulated plans to incorporate these rules as plan
terms. In the ERISA setting, the employer or other plan sponsor has
broad discretion over the content of plan terms. 16 0 The Internal
Revenue Service, which, together with the Department of Labor, has
regulatory authority over ERISA, 16 1 has recently expressed its view
that a pension plan's terms may provide that in the event that a
participant becomes divorced, the "designation of [the] former spouse as

156. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.

157. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.
158. See, for example, Waggoner's account of how federal courts have differed in deciding
which state slayer laws to consult in devising federal common law on wealth transfer issues.
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalizationof Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1635, 1649-51(2014).
159. 532 U.S. at 149.
160. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (holding that
"[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time,
to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans"). The holding was extended to ERISA-covered
pension plans in Lockheed Corp. u. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
161. Regarding the division of responsibility for ERISA between the IRS and the Department
of Labor, see LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 30, at 96-97.
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plan beneficiary is automatically revoked." 162 It would be open to either
agency to require that ERISA-covered pension and insurance plans
adopt such a term. 163
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent decades the process of wealth transfer on death has
undergone a profound transformation. The older probate system of
court-supervised transfer has been increasingly displaced by a
nonprobate system in which financial intermediaries (including banks,
insurers, mutual funds, and pension plans) transfer the owner's account
balance on death. Beneficiary designations on financial accounts tend
ever more to do the work of family wealth transmission that used to be
done in the probate process.
In the United States, wealth transfer, like other components of
family and property law, is prevailingly state law. Indeed, the federal
courts have a long tradition of deferring to state probate administration
in cases that would otherwise come within the scope of federal
jurisdiction. 164 Although the dominant purpose of wealth transfer lawimplementing transferor's intent 165 -is straightforward, the field is
nevertheless large and complex. 166 Human affairs are complex, human
foresight is limited, and many persons who draft instruments of
transfer are inexpert. In consequence, the courts and the legislatures
have accreted over the centuries a body of constructional principles and
situation-specific constructional rules 167 that are meant to implement
the transferor's intent in cases in which the instrument of transfer is
silent or ambiguous on the point. This body of constructional law, which
originated in the law of wills, has been extended in recent decades to

162. I.R.S., Employee Plan News, Issue 2013-3 (Sept. 13, 2013), available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epn_2013_3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DZ6K-T88D. In this vein,
see Moran's suggestion "to provide in the plan document that upon a participant's divorce, any
beneficiary designation forms will be invalid . . . ." Anne E. Moran, Stuck in the Middle, A
Cautionary Tale about Beneficiary DesignationForms, 34 EMP. REL. L.J. Spring 2009, at 70, 73.
163. For an exercise of regulatory authority somewhat comparable to the action of the
Department of Veteran Affairs in mandating a slayer rule for federal military insurance programs,
see supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
164. Regarding the probate exception to federal jurisdiction, see 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3609, 3610, at 381-96, 423-64 (2009 &
Supp. 2014). See also James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the ProbateException,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1533 (2014).
165. See supra text accompanying note 19.
166. E.g., the immense set of constructional rules arising from problems of class gift
terminology, regarding which see PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 13.1-16.3.
167. See id. §§ 11.1- 11.3.
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nonprobate transfers, in response to the nonprobate revolution. 168 Much
of the work of unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers has
taken place under the careful deliberative processes of the Uniform Law
Commission and the American Law Institute. 16 9 The Washington and
Virginia divorce revocation statutes at issue in Egelhoff and Hillman
exemplify this trend. There is reason to think that these constructional
principles are even more important when applied to nonprobate
transfers than to wills, because the beneficiary designation forms
required under the account terms of many financial intermediaries
restrict the ability of a transferor to impose conditions, 170 such as (for
divorce revocation) "to Mary Smith if she and I are then still married."
Because wealth transfer law is prevailingly state law, federal
legislation and federal courts have played virtually no role in the project
of unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers. Indeed, federal
courts are sometimes unaware of basic principles of the wealth transfer
field, as in Hillman, in which both the majority opinion1 71 and a
concurrence by Justice Alito1 72 Voice the mistaken assumption that a
life insurance beneficiary designation can be altered by will. 17 3
Unfamiliarity with basic principles of trust law has been a recurrent

168. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 13.
169. Regarding the role of the uniform laws and the restatements, see, e.g., Langbein, supra
note 6; John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 1069, 1079-81 (2007); Edward C. Halbach, Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1883-88 (2000); John H. Langbein
& Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate
Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 872-90 (1992). Regarding the pervasive influence of the state trust and
estate bars in the state-level enactment of legislation in the field, see Langbein, supra note 6, at
5-7.
170. A point emphasized in Sterk & Leslie, supra note 9, at 213-15.
171. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1952 (2013) ("[A] legislature might have reasonably
believed that an employee's will is more reliable evidence of his intent than a beneficiary
designation form executed years earlier.").
172. Id. at 1957 (Alito, J., concurring) (asserting that the Virginia divorce-revocation statute
would pertain "even if the insured manifests a clear contrary intent, such as by providing
specifically in a recent will that the proceeds are to go to another party").
173. For the rule against altering a life insurance beneficiary designation by will, see, for
example, McCarthy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 704 N.E. 2d 557, 560 (N.Y. 1998); Cook u. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc., 428 N.E. 2d 110, 116 (Ind. App. 1981). Cases are collected in Wanda Ellen
Wakefield, Annotation, Effectiveness of Change of Named Beneficiary of Life or Accident Insurance
Policy by Will, 25 AL.R.4th 1164, 1164-78 (1983 & Supp.). For bank account beneficiary
designations, the rule against revocation by will is codified in UPC§ 2-613(b). For criticism of the
rule, see PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 7.2, cmt. e. An ERISA plan document can
trump the rule. E.g., Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Kennedy, 358 F.3d 1295, 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.
2004).
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theme of the Supreme Court's troubled ERISA case law.1 74 Hillman
evidences comparable unfamiliarity with basic principles of restitution
and unjust enrichment.
Perhaps the most disquieting dimension of the decisions in
Egelhoff and Hillman is the Court's disinterest in the purpose of the
state-law rule that the two decisions suppressed. In neither case did the
Court confront the intent-implementing rationale of the divorce
revocation rule, a purpose that is wholly congruent with the regulatory
objectives of ERISA, and with FEGLIA's mission to provide federal
employees with low-cost group life insurance. The Court's disinterest in
the purpose of the divorce revocation rule also meant that the Court
had no understanding of the magnitude of the harm that preempting
the rule would cause. Egelhoff and Hillman work at cross purposes to
one of the most important policy objectives of state legislation and
decisional law in the wealth transfer field over the past generation, the
movement to unify the constructional law of probate and nonprobate
transfers. Just when state wealth transfer law has largely succeeded in
developing constructional rules that overcome the probate/nonprobate
division, the Supreme Court has opened a new and pointless division
between state and federally regulated nonprobate accounts. In
consequence of Egelhoff and Hillman, functionally identical transfers
must be treated oppositely. The divorce revocation rule continues to
apply to the probate estate of a Virginia resident such as Warren
Hillman, and to any Metropolitan Life policy that he may have
purchased individually, but not to the functionally identical
Metropolitan Life policy that he purchased through the FEGLIA
program, or that he might have purchased through the ERISAregulated plan of a private employer. Needless to say, the Court in
Egelhoff and Hillman did not and could not justify this result.

174. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1338-60 (2003); John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 217-23 (1991).

